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Abstract 
 
From a sample of commercial banks in the Asia-Pacific region over the 1994-2009 
period, this study highlights that banks in less competitive markets exhibit lower loan 
growth and higher instability. Such instability is further followed by a decline in deposit 
growth, suggesting that Asian banks are also subject to indirect market discipline 
mechanisms through bank competition. This study therefore sheds light on the 
importance of enhancing bank competition to overcome bank risk and strengthen 
financial intermediation. Likewise, this study advocates the importance of strengthening 
market discipline to reduce bank riskiness regardless of the degree of competition in the 
banking industry.  
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008 that has resulted in a cyclical 
downturn around the world, bank regulators are concerned with two major conflicting 
objectives. These include boosting financial intermediation that spurs economic growth 
or enhancing bank stability that may reduce banks‟ incentive to grant new loans. 
However, to our best knowledge, there is no previous study that examines the implication 
of bank competition on stability and financial intermediation simultaneously. This paper 
attempts to fill this gap.  
As further contribution, we also examine the role of market discipline in the link 
between bank competition and risk. Schaeck and Cihak (2007) document the link 
between bank competition and market discipline through bank capitalization. In this 
sense, competing banks tend to behave prudently by holding higher capital ratios as a 
“peer disciplining tool” to gain competitive advantage. For a similar reason, in order to 
gain competitive advantage, banks in more competitive markets can provide better 
conditions that facilitate bank depositors to monitor banks than those in less competitive 
markets. This situation will in turn strengthen ex-post market discipline by bank 
depositors whenever bank risk increases or decreases via changes in bank competition.   
In order to assess such issues, we focus on the Asia Pacific region for several 
reasons. First, the banking sector remains a major source of financing for the real sector 
in Asia Pacific (Adams, 2008). Second, substantial consolidations in the banking industry 
also occurred in Asia Pacific after the 1997 Asian crisis which may in turn affect the 
degree of bank competition (Soedarmono et al., 2013).  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Aside from highlighting our 
research contribution, Section 2 describes prior literature on the bank competition-
stability nexus, as well as the bank competition-growth nexus. Section 3 presents our data 
and methodology. Section 4 discusses our empirical findings and provides some 
robustness checks, while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Related literature  
With regards to the link between bank competition and stability, two major 
hypotheses have emerged in the literature, i.e. the “charter value hypothesis” and the 
“competition-stability hypothesis”. In parallel, regarding the impact of bank competition 
on economic development, there are also two conflicting hypotheses, i.e. the “perfect 
information hypothesis” and the “asymmetric information hypothesis”. 
The charter value hypothesis argues that higher bank competition eroding bank 
charter value can contribute to higher instability due to higher bank risk taking. Keeley 
(1990) documents that after financial liberalization in the nineties, US banks exhibited a 
decline in their charter value and an increase in risk profiles. Similarly, Demsetz et al. 
(1996) document that US banks with higher charter value tend to have better asset 
quality. Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) also support the charter value hypothesis in the 
case of Latin America. In addition, Beck et al. (2006) show that the probability of 
banking crises in countries with a concentrated banking system is lower than in countries 
with a competitive banking system from a sample of 69 countries during the 1980-1997 
period. Yet, Ariss (2010) has also focused on the case of developing countries and 
supports the charter value hypothesis.  
In contrast, another strand of literature shows that higher bank competition has 
also a stabilizing effect when asymmetric information in loan markets is taken into 
consideration (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Boyd et al, 2006). This is because the 
presence of asymmetric information in loan markets exacerbates entrepreneurial moral 
hazard to undertake risky projects in order to offset higher interest rates charged by banks 
with higher market power. Higher borrowers‟ risk can in turn negatively affect bank 
stability through a risk-shifting mechanism (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This notion is 
often referred to as the competition-stability hypothesis. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) 
support the competition-stability hypothesis in the case of European banks, while Liu et 
al (2012) also find the consistent results for Southeast Asian banks. Soedarmono et al 
(2013) indicate that higher market power in Asian banking is associated with higher bank 
moral hazard, although banks hold a higher capital ratio. This finding is however 
reversed during the 1997 crisis period indicating that market power is necessary to 
prevent an increase in bank default risk in times of crisis. Using a sample of commercial 
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banks in Asia Pacific as well, Fu et al. (2014) document the heterogeneous impact of 
bank concentration and competition on bank stability. While greater concentration fosters 
financial fragility, lower pricing power stemming from higher competition also results in 
higher bank riskiness. 
While the link between bank competition and financial stability remains 
inconclusive, a related important issue is how bank competition affects financial 
intermediation and economic growth. On the one hand, the perfect information 
hypothesis argues that higher bank competition leads to higher economic growth because 
banks with higher market power tend to charge higher loan prices which may in turn 
preclude financial intermediation activities (Black and Strahan, 2002; Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005; Cetorelli and Gamberra, 2001). In a similar vein, Aysan et al. (2013) show 
that higher bank competition increases the outreach of banks in Turkey. Yet, Aydemir 
(2013) also studies the Turkish banking sector and reports that higher bank concentration 
exacerbates the issues of collusion in the loan market. On the other hand, the asymmetric 
information hypothesis states that in the presence of asymmetric information, banks with 
higher charter value can erode asymmetric information by investing in relationship 
lending activities. Relationship lending can reduce firms‟ financing constraints, spur loan 
availability and enhance economic growth (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berlin and 
Mester, 1998). 
Building on these previous studies, a potential trade-off between bank stability 
and financial intermediation can occur along with changes in bank competition. Higher 
bank competition is indeed expected to boost loan growth because banks in more 
competitive markets tend to misprice their loan interest rates in expanding intermediation 
activities (Ogura, 2006). However, Foos et al (2010) provide evidence in which higher 
loan growth can lead to higher bank risk. In this paper, we attempt to contribute to the 
ongoing debate regarding the impact of bank competition on both stability and financial 
intermediation.  
Our paper extends the literature in several directions. First, a large number of 
studies rely on bank concentration or Herfindahl index measures to assess the market 
structure of banks that influences bank market power, while our present study employs 
the non-structural measure of competition derived from the new industrial organization 
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approach following Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) and Soedarmono et al. (2011; 2013). 
Second, prior studies only focus on the immediate impact of bank competition, while the 
present study also explores whether today‟s bank risk and loan growth is determined by 
last year‟s bank competition. Third, we extend the competition-stability-growth nexus by 
examining whether bank competition affects depositors‟ reaction to bank risk and hence, 
we embrace issues on the role of market discipline exerted by bank depositors.  
 Prior studies demonstrate that bank depositors indeed strongly react to bank risk. 
In the presence of market discipline, bank depositors require higher interest rates on their 
deposits or withdraw their deposits when banks take on more risk (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004; Martinez-Peria and Schumkler, 2001). In this paper, our investigation 
regarding market discipline differs from previous studies, since we assess bank 
depositors‟ reaction to bank risk indirectly via bank competition. Because bank 
competition might affect bank riskness, we expect that bank depositors‟ reaction to bank 
risk is also dependent on bank competition.  
 
3. Data, variables and methodology 
3.1. Data  
An unbalanced panel of annual bank-level data are retrieved from BankScope 
Fitch IBCA. Our dataset consists of 686 commercial banks from 12 countries in Asia 
Pacific from 1994 to 2009. These countries include China (103), Hong Kong (68), India 
(84), Indonesia (108), Malaysia (63), Sri Lanka (14), South Korea (50), Taiwan (50), 
Thailand (40), Pakistan (34), Philippines (39), and Vietnam (33)
2
. Moreover, country-
specific data are also taken from various sources. These include the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) established by the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank Financial Structure Dataset established by Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), as well 
as the economic freedom index at the country level coming from Heritage Foundation. 
All country-specific data other than the economic freedom index (ECOFREE) come from 
the IFS. ECOFREE comes from Heritage Foundation. 
                                                 
2
 The number of banks in each country is shown in parentheses. In the meantime, our sample could suffer 
from a survival bank bias because some banks that have failed are not necessarily present throughout our 
entire sample period, particularly after they default. Nevertheless, because we use panel data techniques 
and because we have not eliminated the observations on banks that have failed prior to their default this 
should be less of a concern. 
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3.2. Variables  
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
Bank loan growth is used to assess financial intermediation. Let i and t represent 
bank index and time index, respectively. Following Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), we 
define bank loan growth as follows: 
   
1,,1,,,
5.0


tititititi
TATALLDLOAN  
L is banks‟ total loans in million US dollar, while TA is banks‟ total assets in million US 
dollar. For robustness considerations, we also consider another measure of bank loan 
growth, which is the annual growth rate of total loans (LOANG).  
In the meantime, we use credit risk and income volatility measures to assess bank 
stability. Credit risk is defined as the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP), 
while income volatility is the standard deviation of the return on assets computed from a 
three-period rolling window (SDROA). In other words, the standard deviation of return on 
assets at time t is calculated based on the return on assets from time t to 2t .  
Finally, in order to measure how bank depositors react to bank risk, we use the 
following measure where D is bank total deposits in million US dollar.  
   
1,,1,,,
5.0


tititititi
TATADDDDEPO  
Alternatively, we consider the annual growth rate of total deposits (DEPOG) as in 
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001).  
 
3.2.2. Bank competition 
In order to assess bank competition, we construct the Lerner index derived from 
the industrial organization approach. Specifically, we follow Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) 
that modify the non-structural measure of competition derived from Bresnahan (1982) 
and applied to Japanese banks. The merit of this measure is that it does neither require 
any assumption on the equilibrium of the banking market as in Panzar and Rosse (1987), 
nor the market structure of each bank which can be different across banks, even for 
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similar types of banks. Moreover, the non-structural measure of bank competition can be 
computed easily using indicators from banks‟ financial statements. Hence, the degree of 
bank competition at the country level is reflected by the average capacities of banks for 
each country in pricing their products above marginal cost. Using a panel data 
methodology, Uchida and Tsutsui‟s (2005) method can also capture changes in the 
degree of competition from one period to the other.  
Likewise, the aggregate index of bank market power derived by Uchida and 
Tsutsui (2005) is already used in previous studies related to Asian banks. These include 
Soedarmono et al. (2011) and Soedarmono et al. (2013). Specifically, the degree of bank 
competition is computed using the system of equations as follows: 
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        
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

     (1) 
 
Each variable with bars represents a deviation from its cross-sectional mean in each time 
period. Bank competition for each year is represented by  1,0
t
  depicting the 
conjectural variations of elasticity of total banking industry outputs with respect to the 
output of bank i. In the case of perfect competition, 0
t
  ; under pure monopoly, 
1
t
  ; and finally, 0
t
 implies pricing below marginal cost.  
 Moreover,
it
C  is defined by total expenses, 
it
q  by total earning assets, 
it
d  by total 
deposits and short-term funding, 
it
w  by the ratio of operating expenses to total assets, 
it
R  
by total revenue, 
it
r  by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits, 
it
p  by the ratio of 
total revenue to total earning assets. 
t
GDPG , 
t
IR  and 
it
TA  are factors that affect the 
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demand for loans, defined as the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP), the short-
term interest rate, and bank total assets, respectively.  
 To estimate System (1), country-level estimations are conducted and we use the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. Moreover,
t
  is estimated by annual 
time dummy variables and   by bi-annual time dummy variables (every two years), 
because   values are linearly dependent on the time-specific variables (GDPG and IR). 
Eventually, 
t
  denotes the Lerner index of the banking industry in each country over 
time (LERNER). Hence, higher LERNER is associated with higher market power (or 
lower competition) in the banking industry. 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
 Several bank-specific control variables are incorporated in this study. First, we 
consider the banks‟ total capital adequacy ratio (CAR), because bank capital ratios 
admittedly affect lending behaviour which may lead to “capital crunch” problems 
(Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1995). Second, we incorporate the ratio 
of total deposits to total assets (DEPO) as a control variable which directly affects deposit 
growth (DDEPO or DEPOG). Third, another source of loan growth and bank risk is the 
extent to which banks engage in non-interest income activities. In particular, banks 
engaging in fee and commission-based income can underprice loans and hence, granting 
loans at a lower cost in order to sell other fee-based products to their customers (Lepetit 
et al., 2008). This may in turn foster loan growth, but underestimated credit risk may 
erode bank stability. To account for non-interest income activities, we incorporate the 
ratio of non-interest income to total revenue (NNI) as a control variable. Furthermore, 
bank size (SIZE) measured by the logarithm of banks‟ total assets is also considered 
control variable because larger bank size tends to exacerbate bank risk taking (Mishkin, 
2006) and to some extents, larger banks are subject to greater market discipline 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2011).  
 Aside from bank-specific factors, we also consider country-specific factors as 
control variables. We specifically include the inflation rate (INF), the growth rate of real 
per capita gross domestic product (GDPG), the degree of economic freedoms 
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(ECOFREE), and the foreign exchange reserves growth rate (FOREXG) to control for 
various country-specific characteristics, such as economic development, institutional 
quality, macroeconomic stability, and so on.  
 
 
3.3. Methodology 
 In terms of econometric methodology, we use a dynamic panel data model 
because loan growth, risk and deposit growth in banking vary over time. Arguably, their 
current values at time t are also more likely to be dependent on their value at time 1t . 
Based on the nature of these dependent variables, the use of dynamic panel data 
methodology is relevant. Dynamic panel data models that account for the one year-lagged 
value of dependent variable as control variable, and that are able to endogenize several 
explanatory variables are again appropriate to cope with reverse causality problems. 
Dynamic panel data models are also appropriate to analyze both the short-run and long-
run effects of explanatory variables on dependent variables.  
To estimate our dynamic panel data models, we use the two-step Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimations following Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). This method is also referred to as the system GMM. The 
system GMM is essentially an extension of the standard GMM developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). Arellano and Bond (1991) only consider the first difference of each 
variable in the regressions, while the lagged levels of explanatory variables are used as 
instruments. The use of the lagged levels as instruments may be inappropriate, 
particularly when variables are close to a random walk. To overcome this shortcoming, 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) develop the system GMM to 
improve the standard GMM by introducing the levels equation to produce a system of 
two equations consisting of the levels equation itself and the first-differenced equation. 
Hence, lagged differences of the explanatory and dependent variables can be valid 
instruments for the levels equation. Eventually, Baltagi (2005) proves that the system 
GMM produces more efficient and precise estimates than the Standard GMM.  
In this meantime, our explanatory variable of interest is the degree of bank 
competition (LERNER). Given the possibility that banks do not immediately respond to 
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changes in market power, it is also worth examining whether bank market power after a 
one year time lag or LERNER(-1) has an impact on dependent variables. We consider that 
LERNER and LERNER(-1) as predetermined variables, because both variables are 
estimated using the SUR method based on a system of three equations as shown in 
System (1). Hence, LERNER and LERNER(-1) can contain measurement error and thus, 
need to be instrumented.  
We also consider CAR as a predetermined variable, because bank capital 
management is not strictly exogeneous, because it depends on banks‟ managerial 
discretion, and bank-specific and country-specific characteristics. Finally, we also 
consider GDPG as a predetermined variable, because the real per capita income growth is 
dependent on various factors, including bank market power (Fernandez et al, 2010).  
Given that our models contains an autoregressive variable, we then use the 
orthogonal deviations transformation of instrumental variables in order to take cross-
section fixed effects into account. Considering bank-level fixed effects is an important 
dimension because our bank sample is heterogeneous and comes from different countries 
with different macroeconomic, institution and regulatory environments. We further 
include time dummies in our models to account for time fixed-effects. Yet, we also take 
into account Windmeijer‟s (2005) finite sample correction to ensure that our estimates are 
robust. Finally, we verify the validity of our dynamic panel data models using AR (2) test 
and Hansen-J test. The GMM model is valid when the AR (2) test and the Hansen-J test 
are both not significant and hence, showing that there is no second order serial correlation 
among errors of first-differenced equation, and that our identifying restrictions are valid, 
respectively. 
  
4. Empirical results  
To accurately conduct our empirical investigation, we initially eliminate values 
which are higher than 1 and smaller than 0 for CAR, DEPO, and NNI. Table 1 presents 
the descriptive statistics of all the “clean” variables used in this study. Moreover, Table 2 
presents the correlation structure of such variables. As no notable correlation can be 
found between all independent variables considered in this study, multicollinearity issues 
are therefore less likely to occur. 
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[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
 
 
4.1. Bank competition and loan growth 
 Since banks operate in a more competitive market, they tend to boost loans by 
setting lower loan prices to attract new borrowers (Ogura, 2006). Prior literature also 
suggests that higher degree of bank competition boosts small businesses development, as 
borrowing costs decline (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Cetorelli and Gamberra, 2001). 
Building on these papers, we focus our investigation on the impact of bank market power 
on loan growth as a proxy of financial intermediation. 
  In Table 3, we highlight that banks in less competitive markets (higher LERNER) 
tend to reduce loan growth (DLOAN or LOANG). Our findings are thus consistent with 
the perfect information hypothesis arguing that higher bank competition leads to higher 
economic growth, because banks in less competitive markets tend to charge higher loan 
interest rates which may in turn preclude financial intermediation (Black and Strahan, 
2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Cetorelli and Gamberra, 2001). We further notice that 
DLOAN and LOANG equations are both valid, because both the AR (2) test and the 
Hansen-J test are not significant.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
As a robustness check, we exclude banks operating in China and South Korea 
from our sample. Indeed, Chinese banks have been highly regulated since the aftermath 
of the 1997 Asian crisis and thus, policies aiming at encouraging competition in banking 
has been a challenging process. Similarly, the South Korean banking system was also 
relatively uncompetitive and severely affected by the 1997 Asian crisis (Kataoka, 1999). 
During the 1997 Asian crisis, there are at least 14 Korean banks that failed 
simultaneously. In order to exclude the special characteristics of these two countries, we 
therefore run estimations without Chinese banks and South Korean banks. Table 4 
presents empirical results for this purpose. Specifically, the negative link between 
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LERNER and loan growth (DLOAN or LOANG) is not altered. Yet, all the GMM models 
shown in Table 4 are also valid because the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are both not 
significant.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 Several insights can be drawn from these findings. Banks in less competitive 
markets indeed tend to have higher market power which enables them to increase their 
lending rates. Although this behavior decreases financial intermediation and hampers 
economic growth, this behavior might also due to the fact that banks in less competitive 
markets are more prudent than those in competitive markets because of the fear of losing 
their franchise (the charter value hypothesis). In other words, for banks in less 
competitive markets, greater market power acts as a self-disciplining factor that limits 
excessive risk taking. Accordingly, credit risk might be priced appropriately, which 
unfortunately leads to higher lending rates and lower loan growth.  
If we consider the presence of asymmetric information in loan markets, 
entrepreneurs who obtain loans can respond to higher loan pricing by running riskier 
projects to offset higher lending rates. Higher entrepreneurs‟ moral hazard can therefore 
exacerbate bank riskiness through risk-shifting mechanisms (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
On the contrary, in the absence of asymmetric information, bank riskiness will decline 
with higher LERNER, as long as banks in less competitive markets do not underestimate 
risk and set up lending rates appropriately, albeit reducing loan growth afterward. In the 
following section, we investigate the impact of LERNER on bank riskiness in order to 
verify whether the negative link between LERNER and bank loan growth (DLOAN or 
LOANG) is presumably characterized by the presence of asymmetric information.  
 
4.2. Bank competition and risk 
In Table 3 and Table 4, we also document our empirical results on the nexus 
between LERNER and bank risk measured by credit risk (LLP) and income volatility 
(SDROA). We find that higher LERNER is associated with higher LLP and SDROA 
regardless of whether or not we exclude Chinese and South Korean banks from our 
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sample. This suggests that banks in less competitive markets tend to have higher credit 
risk and income volatility. Accordingly, the immediate adverse impact of market power 
on bank stability is also apparent in Soedarmono et al (2011 & 2013), although they 
apply a static panel data model. 
Nevertheless, the positive link between LERNER and bank credit risk (LLP) is 
reversed when we consider the impact of LERNER at time t – 1. In other words, although 
higher LERNER immediately increases bank credit risk, higher LERNER may also reduce 
it after a one year time lag as shown by the coefficients associated with LERNER(-1). 
Given that our purpose is to assess how bank competition affects both stability and 
financial intermediation, we do not take the results associated with LERNER(-1) into 
close consideration, because LERNER(-1) does not affect bank loan growth (DLOAN or 
LOANG). 
Combining the results regarding the competition-growth nexus, as well as the 
competition-stability nexus, we show that although banks in less competitive markets 
reduce loan growth, such a reduction is not sufficient to improve their stability. Hence, as 
mentioned earlier, asymmetric information problems are more likely to exist exacerbating 
entrepreneurs‟ moral hazard which in turn might increase the riskiness of banks in less 
competitive markets.  
 
4.3. Bank competition and market discipline 
 Since higher market power in banking leads to lower loan growth but higher 
instability in Asian banks, it is worth examining whether such instability can be mitigated 
by market discipline. In this section, we are particularly interested in the role played by 
bank depositors in facing higher bank riskiness. Market discipline is indeed of particular 
interest for bank regulators and it has been further emphasized in the new Basel accords. 
From Table 3 and Table 4, we observe that the link between LERNER and deposit 
growth (DDEPO and DEPOG) is negative and significant. This indicates that banks in 
less competitive markets experience lower deposit growth. Given that banks in less 
competitive markets (higher LERNER) tend to exhibit higher credit risk and income 
volatility as discussed in the previous section, our results show that bank depositors are 
indeed sensitive to higher bank risk along with an increase in market power in banking. 
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Yet, our GMM models for DDEPO and DEPOG equations are valid because AR (2) test 
and Hansen-J test are both insignificant. 
In Table 3 and Table 4 as well, we also document a positive link between 
LERNER(-1) and deposit growth. This positive link is due to the fact that LERNER(-1) 
exhibits a negative impact on bank credit risk. As bank credit risk declines due to greater 
market power in banking after a one year time lag, bank depositors also react positively 
by increasing deposit growth.  
Overall, we show that market discipline indeed exists in Asian banks due to 
different characteristics of market power in the banking industry. For banks operating in 
less competitive market, deposit growth declines in response to higher market power in 
banking. However, deposit growth can also increase along with greater market power in 
banking (lower competition), particularly after a one year time lag.   
  
4.5. Additional robustness checks 
 To this end, because the number of banks in our sample differs substantially from 
country to country, we also perform Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimations in order 
to ensure that our results are not subject to sample bias affected by countries with a large 
number of banks. In conducting the WLS estimations, we incorporate time dummies, but 
not individual fixed effects, because individual fixed effects cannot be included in WLS 
estimations (Hoechle, 2007). Table 5 presents our results using the WLS estimation for 
banks from the 12 countries considered in this study, while Table 6 presents the similar 
results without incorporating banks from China and South Korea. Overall, our main 
results discussed earlier are not substantially altered. 
 
[Insert Table 5 and 6 here]  
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper aims to highlight the effect of bank competition on financial 
intermediation and bank riskiness. Our findings strongly emphasize the negative link 
between market power in banking and bank loan growth as a proxy of financial 
intermediation. Market power is also positively associated with bank instability measured 
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by credit risk and income volatility. Banks in less competitive markets are indeed more 
unstable and contribute less than those in more competitive markets to strengthen 
financial intermediation. This study further highlights the role of market discipline 
exerted by bank depositors. As market power in banking results in higher instability, 
bank depositors in less competitive markets tend to deposit lower amounts. Overall, our 
results are robust to model specification. 
To a lesser extent, we also show that the link between bank competition, risk 
taking and deposit growth might be altered when we consider the one-year-lagged value 
of bank competition. Specifically, although greater market power in the banking industry 
can immediately lead to higher instability and lower deposit growth, greater market 
power can also reduce bank riskiness and increase deposit growth after a one year time 
lag. We therefore highlight that the charter value hypothesis and the competition-stability 
hypothesis might be in place simultaneously depending on whether we consider the 
immediate or longer run implication of bank competition. Yet, we further highlight that 
whatever the impact of competition on bank riskiness, the role of market discipline 
exerted by bank depositors remains important. As bank market power increases (reduces) 
instability, bank deposit growth declines (increases).  
In addition, our results regarding the impact of bank competition on financial 
intermediation and deposit growth do not support the theoretical model by Park and 
Pennacchi (2009) in which greater bank competition due to market-extension mergers 
(acquisitions involving two banks in different markets) can help borrowers, but harm 
depositors. In our study, greater bank competition is beneficial to both bank borrowers 
and depositors simultaneously at least in the short run.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Lerner  
     
Q Total earning assets (million USD) 12359.5 58044.65 0.126 1.44E+06 
C Total expenses (million USD) 90240.113 529468.45 0.013 13897949 
D Total deposits and short term funding (million USD) 10535.445 54044.344 0.002 1431017.9 
R Total revenue (million USD) 75003.77 483640.2 -2754.779 13897949 
W Ratio of total operating expenses to total assets  0.023908 0.024928 1.65E-04 0.878493 
R Ratio of interest expenses to total deposits 0.10337 0.21097 1.52E-02 8.5098 
P Ratio of total revenue to total earning assets 13.52625 32.28294 -1.277457 675.2431 
IR Annual short-term interest rate 0.07779 0.07444 0.0007 0.6279 
 
     Explanatory var. 
LERNER  Lerner index (Lerner index)  0.0534 0.52399 -0.98699 1.92911 
SIZE Logarithm of bank total assets 7.48835 2.01198 -1.09961 14.36128 
DEPO Ratio of total deposits to total assets 0.72574 0.19381 0.00003 0.99655 
CAR Total capital adequacy ratio 0.16454 0.11255 0.005 0.915 
NNI Ratio of non-net interest revenue to total revenue 0.21961 0.20513 0.00007 0.99848 
INF Inflation rate 0.06067 0.05901 -0.03947 0.5802 
GDPG Real per capita GDP growth rate 0.05514 0.03393 -0.13127 0.14195 
ECOFREE Economic freedom index 0.61457 0.12189 0.386 0.905 
FOREXG Foreign exchange reserves growth rate 0.2002 0.29048 -0.68859 1.63632 
 
     Dependent var. 
DLOAN Loan growth rate 0.0670373 0.4585605 -1.968385 2 
LOANG Actual loan growth rate 0.1339544 0.3200161 -1.981694 1.963238 
LLP Ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 0.0193369 0.051427 0.0000136 0.9486932 
SDROA Standard deviation of ROA from time t to t – 2  0.0067533 0.0105557 0.0000055 0.0748714 
DDEPO Deposit growth rate 0.09762 0.1944373 -1.138423 1.569936 
DEPOG Actual deposit growth rate 0.184506 0.3865803 -0.9979501 3.089286 
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Table 2. Correlation structure of all variables 
Variables DLOAN LOANG LLP SDROA DDEPO DEPOG LERNER 
        DLOAN 1 
      LOANG 0.9023 1 
     LLP -0.2901 -0.2424 1 
    SDROA -0.1907 -0.1318 0.3631 1 
   DDEPO 0.6966 0.6675 -0.1571 -0.129 1 
  DEPOG 0.6149 0.6355 -0.1122 -0.0492 0.8738 1 
 LERNER -0.0235 -0.0374 0.0322 0.0382 -0.0971 -0.0233 1 
CAR -0.0931 -0.0363 0.1321 0.0951 -0.0821 0.0114 0.0219 
DEPO -0.0045 -0.0004 -0.0483 -0.0383 0.1925 0.0138 -0.1957 
NNI -0.0511 -0.0388 0.0094 -0.0585 -0.019 0.033 0.2417 
SIZE 0.0517 -0.0061 -0.1618 -0.1797 0.0146 -0.0502 0.1495 
ECOFREE -0.194 -0.2217 -0.0009 0.0563 -0.2128 -0.1572 0.184 
INF 0.175 0.1626 -0.058 -0.0863 0.137 0.1543 0.3331 
GDPG 0.1351 0.106 -0.1521 -0.1603 0.0946 0.0834 0.2193 
FOREXG 0.2243 0.1954 0.0268 -0.0742 0.3167 0.2437 -0.1171 
 
 
Variables CAR DEPO NNI SIZE ECOFREE INF GDPG FOREXG 
         CAR 1 
       DEPO -0.3191 1 
      NNI -0.0424 -0.1211 1 
     SIZE -0.3898 0.0629 0.0022 1 
    ECOFREE 0.1805 -0.09 0.1161 0.1189 1 
   INF 0.0114 -0.1302 -0.0268 0.0358 -0.171 1 
  GDPG -0.1201 -0.0679 0.151 0.2234 0.0018 0.053 1 
 FOREXG -0.0749 0.0359 -0.0159 0.0955 -0.1556 0.0461 0.0246 1 
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Table 3. Empirical results from the System GMM estimation for all countries. (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Explanatory Variables 
Loan growth Risk Market discipline 
DLOAN LOANG LLP SDROA3 DDEPO DEPOG 
 
    
 
  
  DEP.VAR (-1) -0.06716** 0.17189*** 0.13477*** 0.65190*** 0.04383 0.08996*** 
 
(0.029) (0.039) (0.042) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) 
LERNER -0.04018* -0.12169*** 0.02411*** 0.00156* -0.08954*** -0.12437*** 
 
(0.023) (0.038) (0.008) (0.001) (0.025) (0.047) 
LERNER(-1) 0.02396 0.07020 -0.01250* 0.00056 0.05423** 0.09405** 
 
(0.021) (0.036) (0.007) (0.001) (0.024) (0.045) 
CAR -0.00364 0.00249 0.03878 -0.00059*** -0.00001 -0.00586 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.034) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) 
DEPO -0.00771 0.09844** 0.00509 -0.00014 0.24122*** 0.13799** 
 
(0.031) (0.043) (0.007) (0.001) (0.026) (0.055) 
NNI -0.11075 -0.02127 0.01289* -0.00924*** 0.05321 -0.01337 
 
(0.074) (0.127) (0.007) (0.003) (0.074) (0.153) 
SIZE -0.00382 -0.00462 -0.00125* 0.00484*** 0.06443** 0.10148 
 
(0.035) (0.049) (0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.070) 
ECOFREE 0.18588*** 0.35826*** -0.01261* -0.00327* 0.22309*** 0.43847*** 
 
(0.054) (0.088) (0.007) (0.002) (0.063) (0.129) 
INF 0.50029*** 0.62505*** -0.02300** -0.00636 0.61023*** 0.83569*** 
 
(0.123) (0.188) (0.009) (0.005) (0.124) (0.236) 
GDPG -0.00169*** -0.00237*** -0.08887*** 0.00003** -0.00113*** -0.00164** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
FOREXG 0.09053*** 0.13994*** 0.00774*** -0.00019 0.17341*** 0.26252*** 
 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.003) (0.001) (0.017) (0.034) 
 
    
 
  
  
 
    
 
  
  Observations 3,268 3,038 2,609 3,023 3,037 3,006 
Number of banks 515 496 478 500 497 494 
p-Value for AR(2) test 0.086 0.509 0.837 0.587 0.386 0.669 
p-Value for Hansen J-test  0.516 0.835 0.619 0.795 0.842 0.867 
Endogenous variables LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER 
 
LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) 
 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG 
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Table 4. Empirical results from the System GMM estimation without China and South Korea. (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Explanatory Variables 
Loan growth Risk Market discipline 
DLOAN LOANG LLP SDROA3 DDEPO DEPOG 
 
    
 
  
  DEP.VAR (-1) -0.08285*** 0.15942*** 0.13731*** 0.65119*** 0.02918 0.06672* 
 
(0.032) (0.043) (0.043) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) 
LERNER -0.04816* -0.14229*** 0.03048*** 0.00187* -0.09541*** -0.12612** 
 
(0.025) (0.042) (0.010) (0.001) (0.028) (0.052) 
LERNER(-1) 0.03080 0.08994 -0.01852** 0.00083 0.05733** 0.09952* 
 
(0.023) (0.041) (0.008) (0.001) (0.028) (0.051) 
CAR -0.00719** 0.00080 -0.00219*** -0.00082*** -0.00222 -0.00878 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) 
DEPO -0.01568 0.09704* 0.01062 0.00060 0.22738*** 0.13609** 
 
(0.038) (0.051) (0.008) (0.001) (0.029) (0.067) 
NNI -0.15036** -0.05099 0.03342 -0.00992*** 0.04598 0.01317 
 
(0.070) (0.131) (0.030) (0.003) (0.071) (0.153) 
SIZE -0.03560 -0.03168 0.04167*** 0.00788*** 0.04255 0.10157 
 
(0.050) (0.065) (0.008) (0.002) (0.043) (0.103) 
ECOFREE 0.05067 0.25835** -0.02872 -0.01078*** 0.18149* 0.25453* 
 
(0.085) (0.124) (0.018) (0.004) (0.095) (0.148) 
INF 0.37468** 0.41510* -0.07166*** -0.00723 0.46389*** 0.46914 
 
(0.159) (0.223) (0.027) (0.005) (0.173) (0.303) 
GDPG -0.00126*** -0.00213*** -0.00014* 0.00003** -0.00092** -0.00143* 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
FOREXG 0.08031*** 0.12078*** 0.00563 -0.00077 0.15783*** 0.21193*** 
 
(0.023) (0.032) (0.004) (0.001) (0.021) (0.045) 
 
    
 
  
  Observations 2,757 2,568 2168 2,547 2,066 2,540 
Number of banks 409 397 381 401 315 397 
p-Value for AR(2) test 0.107 0.559 0.816 0.613 0.460 0.739 
p-Value for Hansen J-test  0.990 0.999 1.000 0.992 0.998 0.997 
Endogenous variables LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER 
 
LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) 
 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG 
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Table 5. Empirical results from the weighted least squares regressions for all countries. (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Explanatory Variables 
Loan growth Risk Market discipline 
DLOAN LOANG LLP SDROA3 DDEPO DEPOG 
 
        
  LERNER -0.01475 -0.02753*** 0.00970** 0.00080* -0.01374** -0.00370 
 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) 
CAR -0.46820*** 0.07025 -0.17675* -0.00027 0.07855** 0.27500*** 
 
(0.067) (0.061) (0.097) (0.002) (0.037) (0.076) 
DEPO -0.08252** -0.02913 -0.00651 -0.00087 0.19135*** 0.02997 
 
(0.039) (0.027) (0.012) (0.001) (0.008) (0.042) 
NNI 0.10489*** -0.05482** 0.00326 0.00451*** 0.02787 0.01979 
 
(0.037) (0.027) (0.006) (0.001) (0.020) (0.042) 
SIZE 0.00490** -0.00520*** -0.00229 -0.00070*** -0.00471*** -0.00765*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
ECOFREE -0.15370*** -0.31422*** 0.02923 0.00539*** -0.15550*** -0.29145*** 
 
(0.047) (0.032) (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.036) 
INF -0.35577*** 0.31543*** 0.01321 -0.00156 0.10053*** 0.11697 
 
(0.066) (0.046) (0.027) (0.002) (0.032) (0.083) 
GDPG 2.66888*** 0.84186*** -0.23118*** -0.01325*** 0.72820*** 1.12586*** 
 
(0.214) (0.141) (0.084) (0.005) (0.094) (0.146) 
FOREXG -0.13318*** 0.12221*** 0.00784** -0.00179** 0.16582*** 0.28055*** 
 
(0.027) (0.018) (0.004) (0.001) (0.012) (0.025) 
 
        
  Observations 3,532 3,369 3,087 3,353 3,371 3,351 
R-squared 0.746 0.218 0.265 0.257 0.301 0.165 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6. Empirical results from the weighted least squares regressions without China and South Korea. (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Explanatory variables 
Loan growth Risk Market discipline 
DLOAN LOANG LLP SDROA3 DDEPO DEPOG 
 
        
  LERNER -0.02218** -0.0258*** 0.00335*** 0.00251*** -0.02390*** -0.01195 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) 
CAR -0.13142*** 0.2203*** -0.02467*** -0.00090 0.04992 0.23350*** 
 
(0.049) (0.064) (0.007) (0.002) (0.037) (0.076) 
DEPO -0.08035** 0.0428 -0.00170 -0.00381*** 0.15947*** 0.00671 
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.003) (0.001) (0.019) (0.053) 
NNI -0.11902*** -0.0711 0.03611*** 0.01192*** 0.01814 0.02556 
 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.003) (0.001) (0.028) (0.059) 
SIZE -0.00611** -0.0040 -0.00070*** -0.00084*** -0.00549*** -0.01252*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
ECOFREE 0.01809 -0.2989*** -0.01466*** -0.00077 -0.11397*** -0.18798*** 
 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.003) (0.001) (0.022) (0.038) 
INF 0.14648 0.0505 0.04450*** -0.00562* 0.05508 0.04395 
 
(0.111) (0.097) (0.009) (0.003) (0.060) (0.113) 
GDPG -0.94613*** 0.5625*** -0.05090*** -0.00285 0.43503*** 0.51071*** 
 
(0.170) (0.160) (0.012) (0.006) (0.107) (0.158) 
FOREXG 0.01387 0.0897*** -0.00147 -0.00149* 0.12517*** 0.20630*** 
 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015) (0.029) 
 
        
  Observations 2,975 2,835 2,580 2,816 2,837 2,819 
R-squared 0.103 0.173 0.511 0.130 0.206 0.156 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
